This paper examines the structural contradictions within Nigeria's federal system, arguing that while the 1999 Constitution proclaims federalism under Section 2(1), the distribution of legislative powers creates a centralized system that undermines state autonomy. Through a comparative analysis of Nigeria's constitutional evolution from 1963 to the present, the paper demonstrates a progressive concentration of power at the federal level, with the Exclusive Legislative List expanding from 45 items in 1963 to 68 items in 1999. This expansion, coupled with the doctrine of covering the field which grants federal legislation supremacy over state laws even on concurrent matters, has transformed Nigeria's federalism into what operates functionally as a unitary system.
The paper critically analyzes the constitutional architecture of legislative lists, examining how the division of powers between the Exclusive, Concurrent, and Residual lists operates in practice. It argues that the extensive scope of federal powers, particularly over critical areas such as resource control, labor, police and security services, drugs and poisons, and census, has stripped states of meaningful autonomy and created fiscal dependence that contradicts fundamental principles of federalism. The centralization is traced to military rule, which consolidated power and shaped the
current constitutional framework to favor federal supremacy.
Drawing on comparative analysis with the United States federal system, the paper proposes comprehensive constitutional reforms to restore genuine federalism. Key recommendations include transferring five critical items from the Exclusive to the Concurrent Legislative List: census (Item 8), drugs and poisons (Item 21), labour (Item 34), mines and minerals including oilfields and natural gas (Item 39), and police and security services (Item 45). Such devolution would enhance state capacity to address local needs, promote inter-state competition, reduce ethnic tensions over resource control, and strengthen fiscal autonomy.
The paper concludes that without fundamental restructuring of the legislative lists and enhancement of state fiscal autonomy, Nigeria's federal system will continue to operate as centralized governance masked by federal rhetoric, perpetuating inefficiency, regional grievances, and calls for secession. True federalism requires constitutional rebalancing that transforms states from dependent units into autonomous co-equals capable of self-governance.